Post by Diarist on Feb 18, 2015 8:01:55 GMT 1
We arrived at Chequers early and were introduced to the French delegation and the Cherbourg joint planning staff. When asked why we were here we told them that we had also been tasked to draft a response to an Italian invasion of Abyssinia. Apparently not only does General Gort not know our plan, he's told nobody that TRADOC even has their own plan. Politics?
We patiently listened to the Cherbourg plan and while the top brass were conferring our group decided to keep our plan secret and request a meeting without the Cherbourg planners present. A bit pretentious but we deemed it to be necessary. We passed a note to General Gort and he nodded approval.
When we were asked to present our plan I stated that ours is very similar, (not true). The main difference being that we limit our attacks into the Italian colonies and don't get involved inside Abyssinia itself. With our support the Abyssinian forces would prevail. We also recommended that the Cherbourg plan be adopted, (true, but as a decoy).
Winston Churchill thanked our group then when the meeting was adjourned he requested that our group stay behind - he wished to know which other differences were in our strategy. The Cherbourg group had left so we began by admitting that our plan was totally different to the Cherbourg plan but we do recommend that their plan be accepted as a decoy. If the enemy gets wind of it then all the better. If you accept our plan then it has to be kept secret in order to succeed. Secretary Churchill was now curious and asked us to proceed.
We discussed the current strategy, a mixture of diplomacy and deterrence. Diplomacy by supporting Abyssinia in the League of Nations and Deterrence by sending more forces to East Africa. Neither were working. In fact, it is no longer a question of IF but WHEN Italy attacks Abyssinia. Mussolini will attack no matter what we do or the League of Nations decrees. Which brought us to our second theme - when will Italy attack. We believe that Mussolini will make his move between mid-September and mid-October but we need to be ready by the beginning of September. There were no questions so we proceeded.
Our strategy, we continued, is the opposite of the current strategy. First, we stop trying to accomplish anything in the League of Nations, instead we secretly negotiate deals with Greece and possibly Yugoslavia; and second, the last thing we need to do is deter Italy from attacking Abyssinia. We need them to invade Abyssinia - otherwise that we cannot combat and ultimately defeat their forces.
We argued that our policy of deterrence is working but not in the way we envisaged it. The Italians are sending to East Africa at least ten times the forces we are and they haven't finished yet. We therefore suggest that Britain sends an additional brigade group to Egypt and Sudan, while France moves a division in NW Africa nearer to the Libyan border and in French Somalia the battalion group is increased to a brigade-sized unit. We also send more squadrons to Gibraltar, Tunisia, Malta, Egypt, Sudan and Kenya. This should encourage the Italians to follow suit. We leave the bulk of our fleets in the Western Mediterranean so that they will do likewise.
We need to assemble a Mobile Corps near Marseille/Toulon as if it will be embarked for transport to East Africa and to meet the requirements of the Cherbourg plan. We recommend the 25th Motorized Division in Clermont-Ferrand, the 28th Mountain Division in Chambery and the 31st Mountain Division in Montpelier. Additionally, 'Cavalry' battalions in NE France be grouped in a Cavalry Brigade and assigned to the Mobile Corps. A mechanized artillery brigade should also be added plus support elements. That done we wait for Mussolini to make his move.
When he invades Abyssinia, (let's say on the 1st of October), we do nothing except to go to Geneva and attend the inevitable League of Nations meeting. No doubt Italy will be condemned for its aggression but no meaningful sanctions or military action will result from the conference. That is when Britain and France announce that we are withdrawing from the organization. That got the politicians debating. We argued that the USA is not a member, Germany and Japan have already withdrawn so why are we still in there? Our mainstay in Europe should be the Locarno Treaties, not this toothless League of Nations. If we are no longer a member-state then we will not be bound by their rules, but the best is yet to come.
We still undertake nothing military but we inform President Roosevelt that we intend closing the Suez Canal to all Italian shipping as well as any other nation who supports the Kingdom of Italy, thus warning him to advise US oil firms not to support Italy. On the day after publically announcing our Suez Canal policy we launch an all-out surprise attack on the Italian Navy in its ports. The Mobile Corps, instead of embarking to go to East Africa will advance into western Italy threatening to capture Turin. Unless Mussolini has a magic wand to conjure up new army divisions and air force squadrons, the bulk of his army and air force is in Africa. The Regia Marina is the only effective force defending Italy and with their Navy crippled we should grasp the opportunity to deliver a major blow to Mussolini's dream of a new Roman Empire. Everyone was talking at the same time now.
We argued that it is a golden opportunity, because:
a. a victory in Italy will deny any hope of support for Italian forces overseas. The will be forced to surrender or die,
b. Italy has no friends at the moment - even Hitler is angered with Mussolini because of Austria. The League of Nations has condemned their aggression and it is at war with 2, 3 or maybe 4 of its neighbours,
c. Hitler will also have noticed that the League of Nations is no obstacle to his plans in Europe but he will also be made aware of British and French resolve to combat aggression in Europe. After a resounding defeat of Italy we should be able to form an alliance with Greece, Yugoslavia and Rumania in SE Europe,
d. Turkey will be clearly shown that the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean are British 'ponds' and if they wish to go paddling feel free to use the Black Sea,
e. yes, we are pushing Italy into the German camp but they are already going that way - Mussolini has no other potential ally,
f. finally, a crushing defeat now will mean that also in 4-5 years from now, when Hitler unveils his plans, Italy will still not have recovered.
This is the opening move in the future European War and we will have gained the initiative. We can not win this upcoming war abiding by the Marquess of Queensbury rules. Hitler will probably adopt an East-Europe-first policy thus buying us more time here in the West. The key to success will be our ability to keep this strategy secret. There is no need to inform anybody else about this plan, either here or in France. We handed over our proposal for the chain of command involving only people who already know of the plan.
It was decided to adjourn for lunch and to keep the plan secret. We would meet again at 1500 hrs.
That ended an interesting morning.
We patiently listened to the Cherbourg plan and while the top brass were conferring our group decided to keep our plan secret and request a meeting without the Cherbourg planners present. A bit pretentious but we deemed it to be necessary. We passed a note to General Gort and he nodded approval.
When we were asked to present our plan I stated that ours is very similar, (not true). The main difference being that we limit our attacks into the Italian colonies and don't get involved inside Abyssinia itself. With our support the Abyssinian forces would prevail. We also recommended that the Cherbourg plan be adopted, (true, but as a decoy).
Winston Churchill thanked our group then when the meeting was adjourned he requested that our group stay behind - he wished to know which other differences were in our strategy. The Cherbourg group had left so we began by admitting that our plan was totally different to the Cherbourg plan but we do recommend that their plan be accepted as a decoy. If the enemy gets wind of it then all the better. If you accept our plan then it has to be kept secret in order to succeed. Secretary Churchill was now curious and asked us to proceed.
We discussed the current strategy, a mixture of diplomacy and deterrence. Diplomacy by supporting Abyssinia in the League of Nations and Deterrence by sending more forces to East Africa. Neither were working. In fact, it is no longer a question of IF but WHEN Italy attacks Abyssinia. Mussolini will attack no matter what we do or the League of Nations decrees. Which brought us to our second theme - when will Italy attack. We believe that Mussolini will make his move between mid-September and mid-October but we need to be ready by the beginning of September. There were no questions so we proceeded.
Our strategy, we continued, is the opposite of the current strategy. First, we stop trying to accomplish anything in the League of Nations, instead we secretly negotiate deals with Greece and possibly Yugoslavia; and second, the last thing we need to do is deter Italy from attacking Abyssinia. We need them to invade Abyssinia - otherwise that we cannot combat and ultimately defeat their forces.
We argued that our policy of deterrence is working but not in the way we envisaged it. The Italians are sending to East Africa at least ten times the forces we are and they haven't finished yet. We therefore suggest that Britain sends an additional brigade group to Egypt and Sudan, while France moves a division in NW Africa nearer to the Libyan border and in French Somalia the battalion group is increased to a brigade-sized unit. We also send more squadrons to Gibraltar, Tunisia, Malta, Egypt, Sudan and Kenya. This should encourage the Italians to follow suit. We leave the bulk of our fleets in the Western Mediterranean so that they will do likewise.
We need to assemble a Mobile Corps near Marseille/Toulon as if it will be embarked for transport to East Africa and to meet the requirements of the Cherbourg plan. We recommend the 25th Motorized Division in Clermont-Ferrand, the 28th Mountain Division in Chambery and the 31st Mountain Division in Montpelier. Additionally, 'Cavalry' battalions in NE France be grouped in a Cavalry Brigade and assigned to the Mobile Corps. A mechanized artillery brigade should also be added plus support elements. That done we wait for Mussolini to make his move.
When he invades Abyssinia, (let's say on the 1st of October), we do nothing except to go to Geneva and attend the inevitable League of Nations meeting. No doubt Italy will be condemned for its aggression but no meaningful sanctions or military action will result from the conference. That is when Britain and France announce that we are withdrawing from the organization. That got the politicians debating. We argued that the USA is not a member, Germany and Japan have already withdrawn so why are we still in there? Our mainstay in Europe should be the Locarno Treaties, not this toothless League of Nations. If we are no longer a member-state then we will not be bound by their rules, but the best is yet to come.
We still undertake nothing military but we inform President Roosevelt that we intend closing the Suez Canal to all Italian shipping as well as any other nation who supports the Kingdom of Italy, thus warning him to advise US oil firms not to support Italy. On the day after publically announcing our Suez Canal policy we launch an all-out surprise attack on the Italian Navy in its ports. The Mobile Corps, instead of embarking to go to East Africa will advance into western Italy threatening to capture Turin. Unless Mussolini has a magic wand to conjure up new army divisions and air force squadrons, the bulk of his army and air force is in Africa. The Regia Marina is the only effective force defending Italy and with their Navy crippled we should grasp the opportunity to deliver a major blow to Mussolini's dream of a new Roman Empire. Everyone was talking at the same time now.
We argued that it is a golden opportunity, because:
a. a victory in Italy will deny any hope of support for Italian forces overseas. The will be forced to surrender or die,
b. Italy has no friends at the moment - even Hitler is angered with Mussolini because of Austria. The League of Nations has condemned their aggression and it is at war with 2, 3 or maybe 4 of its neighbours,
c. Hitler will also have noticed that the League of Nations is no obstacle to his plans in Europe but he will also be made aware of British and French resolve to combat aggression in Europe. After a resounding defeat of Italy we should be able to form an alliance with Greece, Yugoslavia and Rumania in SE Europe,
d. Turkey will be clearly shown that the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean are British 'ponds' and if they wish to go paddling feel free to use the Black Sea,
e. yes, we are pushing Italy into the German camp but they are already going that way - Mussolini has no other potential ally,
f. finally, a crushing defeat now will mean that also in 4-5 years from now, when Hitler unveils his plans, Italy will still not have recovered.
This is the opening move in the future European War and we will have gained the initiative. We can not win this upcoming war abiding by the Marquess of Queensbury rules. Hitler will probably adopt an East-Europe-first policy thus buying us more time here in the West. The key to success will be our ability to keep this strategy secret. There is no need to inform anybody else about this plan, either here or in France. We handed over our proposal for the chain of command involving only people who already know of the plan.
It was decided to adjourn for lunch and to keep the plan secret. We would meet again at 1500 hrs.
That ended an interesting morning.